Information Bulletin
Title: Guidance
for Response to Ricin Delivered by Mail
Date: February 9,
2004
Information Bulletin
Title: Guidance for Response to
Ricin Delivered by Mail
Date: February 9, 2004
The
widest dissemination of this material is encouraged and authorized.
DHS
intends to update this Bulletin should it receive additional relevant
information, including information provided to it by the recipients.
Based on this notification, no change to the Homeland Security
Advisory System (HSAS) level is anticipated; the current HSAS level
is YELLOW.
OVERVIEW
This
is a joint DHS and FBI Information Bulletin. DHS
Information Bulletins communicate issues that pertain to the critical
national infrastructure and are for informational purposes only.
While
DHS possesses no information indicating specific terrorist targeting
of U.S. critical infrastructures through the delivery by mail of the
toxin ricin, such targeting would be consistent with certain
terrorists’ stated objectives to disrupt and undermine vital
economic interests in this country.
DETAILS
On
the afternoon of February 2, 2004, Senate staff observed gray
granular powder on an automated mail opening system. Preliminary
field tests indicated the possible presence of a biological toxin.
Samples of the material were tested overnight at a government
laboratory and results indicated the presence of ricin. The three
Senate Office Buildings were closed and secured on February 3rd.
The samples were forwarded to the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia and on February 4th three out of the
four samples tested positive. At this time no threat letter has been
identified and no threat has been received.
Past
incidents involving the presence of ricin have occurred in the United
Sates and the United Kingdom. On October 15, 2003, a postal worker
discovered a business-size envelope containing the toxin ricin in a
mail distribution facility in Greenville, South Carolina. The
letter, which was addressed to the U.S. Department of Transportation,
did not pass through the postal system. In January 2003, law
enforcement agencies in the United Kingdom searched several locations
in London as part of an ongoing counterterrorism investigation and
found small amounts of ricin, as well as equipment that could be used
in its production. In April 1991, several members of a domestic
extremist group in Minnesota extracted ricin from castor beans and
discussed using it against federal law enforcement officers. The
amount of ricin produced could have killed more than 100 people if
effectively delivered.
Background on Ricin
- Ricin is a poison that can be made from the waste (mash) left over from processing castor beans. Ricin can be made in the form of an off-white powder, a mist, or a pellet or it can be dissolved in water or weak acid. It would take a deliberate act to make Ricin and use it to poison people. Ricin is one of several toxins that exert toxicity by inhibiting protein synthesis. Ricin can enter the body through inhalation, ingestion, abraded (non-intact) skin, mucosal membranes (e.g., eyes and nose), and injection. Ricin poisoning is not contagious, and person-to-person transmission does not occur.
Toxicity
Exposure
to ricin may occur through:
- Inhalation, skin, or eye contact: as an aerosol, powder, or dust
- Ingestion: through contamination of food, water, or consumer products
- Injection: directly through the skin
Ricin
toxicity and lethality can vary by dose and route of exposure. In
animal studies, inhalation and intravenous injection have been shown
as the most lethal routes. The lethal dose for humans, by inhalation
or injection, is estimated to be 5 - 10 mg/kg. Because the ricin
protein is large, it is not well absorbed orally or through the skin.
To
date ricin poisonings have only occurred in humans after ingestion
or injection. Ricin is considered to be a much more potent
toxin when inhaled or injected compared with other routes of
exposure, however ricin would need to be dispersed in particles
smaller than 5 microns to be used as an effective weapon via
inhalation. It is technologically difficult to produce ricin
particles of this size and purity.
- For more information about ricin go to: http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/ricin/
SUGGESTED
PROTECTIVE MEASURES
Suggested
Actions for Mail Room, Postal and Shipping Facility Operators
Two
categories of actions are necessary1:
1) Identifying and assessing biological (including ricin) threats; 2)
Managing biological threats that appear credible.
1. Identifying and Assessing Biological Threats
Several
commercial handheld or test-strip ricin detection devices are
available; however the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) have stated that the performance of these assays is unknown.
While many of these tests indicate a high false positive, they may be
more useful in ruling out the presence of ricin. These test kits
should only be used by trained and certified hazardous materials
professionals. If such testing is deemed necessary, personnel should
preserve original evidence for forensic analysis. Automated,
continuously monitoring bio-detection systems are available
commercially; however they may be cost-prohibitive for many
companies.
Measures
that can be taken without installing special detection equipment are
the same for most biological threats and are organized according to
whether the mail is opened or unopened and whether it contains a
written threat or an unidentified container:
Opened
mail that is leaking a suspicious liquid or powder, or mail that has
a suspicious odor: If you open a letter or package and see
an unknown material, or if an unknown material is leaking from the
mail as a liquid, powder, or odor, do not try to clean it up or
otherwise disturb it. Set the mail down on a stable surface and
call the first responder designated to respond to this type of
threat, e.g., the HAZMAT team at the local fire and rescue
department.
Opened
mail that contains a written threat: If anyone in the
organization opens a letter or package with or without powder
and discovers a written threat, such as a note that says “You have
been contaminated with ricin,” put the package or letter down on a
stable surface and call the first responder designated to deal with
this type of threat. The mail center supervisor or the first
responder must ensure that local law enforcement authorities and the
FBI local field office are notified in either of these events.
Unopened
mail: Whenever a mail center worker identifies an
unopened package or letter as “suspicious”, a mail center
supervisor or specially trained employee should examine the mail
piece to confirm that it meets the “suspicious” criteria
established for the location (e.g., it is covered with powder or
appears saturated from the inside). If confirmed, do not open it.
A supervisor or designated mail center worker who is trained to
confirm the identification must be available during all working
hours.
Next,
determine if the mail piece is addressed to a person who actually
works in the facility. If so, and if the addressee can be located in
a reasonable period of time, contact the addressee and ask him or her
to identify the package. If the addressee recognizes the package and
is certain it is not threatening, deliver it. If the addressee does
not recognize the package, or if you cannot locate the addressee,
attempt to contact the individual listed on the return address to
verify the contents of the package. If you successfully contact the
sender of the package, ask them to provide a description of the
contents, intended addressee, and the reason it was mailed to your
location. Provide this information to the addressee for further
verification.
If the addressee does not recognize the package, or if
you cannot locate the addressee, do not open it. The
supervisor or designated mail center worker should call the
previously designated first responder. This first responder will be
responsible for opening the package in a controlled environment and
following the appropriate protocol for evaluation of the threat. A
“controlled environment” may be a glove box, hood with negative
airflow and HEPA filters on the exhaust airflow, or a similar device.
When identifying the first responder who will open suspicious
letters or packages, make sure they have a controlled environment
available.
Mail
that contains an unidentified secondary container: If
x-ray inspection shows a secondary container that may contain an
unknown material, or if you open a letter or package and discover
such a container, do not open or otherwise disturb the secondary
container. Treat the secondary container as suspicious, unopened
mail. As above, first call the addressee and see if they can
identify the container. If he or she cannot be located, then call in
the first responder designated to open suspicious mail.
2.
Managing Biological Threats That Appear Credible
In
the event that a trained first responder, after reviewing the
situation, determines that a possible biological hazard may actually
be present (i.e., a biological agent may have been released into the
workplace, or a biological agent may be present in a package or
envelope that has been opened), the first responder should
take the following steps or ensure that these activities are
performed where appropriate:
- Turn off the ventilation system, fans or window air conditioners for the area of potential release.
- Turn off any high-speed mail processing equipment that may have handled the suspicious mail piece.
- Make sure that the suspicious substance is not disturbed by covering it
- Keep everyone out of any room(s) that may have been contaminated.
In
addition, the first responder should immediately call local law
enforcement authorities and the FBI Field Office and ask to speak to
the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) coordinator. The FBI website
is http://www.fbi.gov.
The FBI WMD coordinator will respond to the scene and will, in
conjunction with other federal, state, local, and internal experts,
conduct a threat assessment and, in conjunction with public health
officials, direct other actions to protect employees and the general
public.
Suggested
Actions for First Responders
Ricin
should only be handled by trained and certified hazardous materials
professionals. Hazardous Materials Teams should be aware that ricin
mostly presents a particulate inhalation or splash hazard depending
on the preparation of the material. Personal protective equipment
(PPE) for first responders, including those who are decontaminating
victims at the scene, is generally determined by the Incident
Commander based on the mechanism of dispersal and whether dispersal
is continuing. Preventing droplets from contacting broken skin or
mucosal membranes (e.g., the mouth or eyes) is important when
decontaminating someone, but airborne dispersal of ricin during
decontamination is an unlikely hazard. PPE can consist of a
chemical-resistant suit with gloves, air purifying respirator or
self-contained breathing apparatus and eye/face protection. Sampling,
seizure, or transportation of ricin should be completed only under
the authority of or in coordination with law enforcement.
Personnel
who may have been exposed to ricin should wash the effected area
vigorously with soap and water. Equipment and supplies can be
decontaminated with a weak (0.5 percent) hypochlorite solution
(bleach) and/or soap and water.
Healthcare
providers should report suspected or known cases of ricin poisoning
immediately to the regional poison control center (telephone,
1-800-222-1222) and to local or state public health agencies, which
will report cases to the CDC, and other federal agencies including
the DHS.
DHS
encourages recipients of this Information Bulletin to report
information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to local law
enforcement, local FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force or the Homeland
Security Operations Center (HSOC). The HSOC may be contacted at:
Phone: (202) 282-8101 or by email at HSCenter@dhs.gov.
1
Adapted from GSA Policy
Advisory: National Guidelines for Assessing and Managing Biological
Threats in Federal Mail Facilities; December 29, 2003
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